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ABSTRACT 
Content vocabulary may have different connotative valúes and different 
denotational meanings in different languages according to cultural idiosyncracy, 
manifested in culture-specific "key" meanings and culture-related scripts. Our 
claim here is that, even in all these cases involving the use of background 
knowledge with culturally-determined differences in different languages, there 
is still room for transfer of a core meaning, which makes translation possible 
and allows transcultural communication. This fact is illustrated by examining 
some words related to the term 'freedom' in English which are claimed not to 
be equivalent across languages. 
1. Introduction 
This article will deal with encyclopedic knowledge of a certain kind, strongly linked to 
culture, and its implications in translation. With that goal in mind, we will start by providing 
a simple example of what can be considered to be a mistranslation. Let us have a look at this 
translation that a commercially-available program1 made of a short literary fragment (Isabel 
Allende. Cuentos de Eva Luna. Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1992:177). 
Source (Spanish): 
Hay toda clase de historias. Algunas nacen al ser contadas, su substancia es el lenguaje y antes 
de que alguien las ponga en palabras son apenas una emoción, un capricho de la mente, una 
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imagen o una intangible reminiscencia: Otras vienen completas, como manzanas, pueden 
repetirse hasta el infinito sin riesgo de alterar su sentido. Existen unas tomadas de la realidad 
y procesadas por la inspiración, mientras que otras nacen de un instante de inspiración y se 
convierten en realidad al ser contadas. Y hay historias secretas que permanecen ocultas en las 
sombras de la memoria, son como organismos vivos, les salen raíces, tentáculos, se llenan de 
adherencias y parásitos y con el tiempo se transforman en materia de pesadillas. A veces para 
exorcizar los demonios de un recuerdo es necesario contarlo como un cuento. 
Translation (English): 
There is all class of histories. Some are born to the counted being. their substance is the 
language and before that somebody puts them in words they are hardly an emotion, a whim of 
the mind, an image or an intangible reminiscence: Another thev come complete, like apples, 
they could repeat until the infinite without risk of altering their sense. They exist some taken 
of tiie reality and processed by the inspiration, while another thev are born of an instant of 
inspiration and thev are converted in reality to the counted being. And there are secret histories 
that remain occult in the shades of tiie memory, they are like live organisms, roots, tentacles, 
leave them are filled of [adherenciasl and parasites and thevwith the time transform in material 
ofnightmares. Sometimes for [exorcizarl the demons of a memory are necessary count it like 
a story. 
m this translation we can see several kinds of problems, which appear underlined. Some of 
them are cases of ambiguity, which the program has mistranslated. This is what happens 
with to the counted being, which should nave been to be told. The program's complete lack 
of understanding of what the text is about has produced this awkward expression. Other 
mistakes, although more grammatical, are also due to semantic blindness. This is the case 
with the indefinite arricie the, which appears too often. In English, this arricie has a more 
restricted use than in Spanish and should not be translated in all cases. Something similar 
happens with the pronoun they, also present in the expression another they, which is used 
instead of others. Other mistakes show limitations in the lexicón of the program, which 
cannot properly transíate certain collocations (using converted in instead of converted into, 
with the time instead of in time, and even a "word-for-word" literal translation: transform 
in material ofnightmares). There are also two words for which there is no translation in the 
program lexicón, with the result that the translation gives up and keeps them within brackets 
("adherencias" and "exorcizar"). 
A right and true translation should have been something like the following: 
There are all kinds of stories. Some are born to be told, their substance is language and, before 
somebody puts them into words, they are hardly an emotion, a whim of the mind, an image or 
an intangible reminiscence: Others come complete, like apples; they can be repeated endlessly 
without the risk of altering their sense. Some exist taken from reality and are processed by 
inspiration, while others are born in an instant of inspiration and are converted into realities to 
be told. And there are secret stories that remain occult in the shades of memory, they are like 
live organisms, grow roots, tentacles, are covered with adherences and parasites and, in time, 
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are transformed into material for nightmares. Sometimes, in order to exorcize the demons of 
a memory it is necessary to tell it as a story. 
The point to be made here is whatever the linguistic phenomena that may be involved in a 
wrong translation, in most cases we can solve the problems that turn up by referring to 
vocabulary, as we nave done above. We know for sure that there are different levéis in 
linguistic analysis, and all of them are relevant. We have the phonological (or graphic) 
level, the morphological level, the syntax level, the semantics level, the pragmatics level... 
but all of them are refiected in vocabulary, because a word is a distinct unit which can be 
easily distinguished and has a high degree of correlation with many linguistic phenomena 
in all the above-mentioned levéis. Reference will be made here as to how vocabulary deals 
with world or encyclopedic knowledge, which is information of a semantico-pragmatic 
nature. 
2. Vocabulary and meaning 
If we examine the semantics of a word, we will find a large conceptual complex with two 
feces: one dynamic, the other static. Vocabulary can be used either to structure and organize 
discourse or to express information content. Both functions may be accompüshed by the 
same item, but most generally the former is carried out by what has been called schematic 
vocabulary and the latter, by the so-called procedural vocabulary (cf. Widdowson, 1983, 
Robinson, 1988). This distinction is related to the opposition between/o/maZ schemata 
(structure-based knowledge structures) and content schemata (content-based knowledge 
structures), commonly referred to in schemata theory (Rumelhart, 1980, Rumelhart and 
Ortony, 1977). Similarly, words can also be considered to be knowledge structures of their 
own, which encapsulate two basic kinds of information: Declarative (about factual 
knowledge) and procedural (about procedures), in a manner similar to the two types of 
information that we find in Anderson's (1983) psychological model of natural language 
processing (ACT), where working memory is helped by both declarative and production 
memory in order to produce language. There is another perspective, too. Langacker (1987: 
163), a cognitive linguist, talks about "cognitive routines" that are activated when using 
vocabulary. Lexical units are points of access to a large network, in which we store 
knowledge about the world. The very psychological complexity of the network can be seen 
in phenomena of cognitive import like prototypicality effects (that is, effects based on the 
fact that categories do not have either clear boundaries or perfect instances but, rather, 
approximations with different degrees of centrality or marginality within the category) 
(Rosch, 1975). 
The above-mentioned two-fold quality of vocabulary and the complex network that lies 
behind every word explains its encyclopedic nature (cf. Peeters 2000), part of which has to 
do with culture. This can be seen, for instance, in cultural "lexical" scripts. In lexical scripts 
(cf. Inchaurralde, 1997) we can see how certain vocabulary items are linked to whole 
sequences of actions that constitute events of relevance to a certain culture. These cultural 
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signalling lexical units can also be applied by means of metaphorical mappings to 
completely new situatíons, as can be seen, for instance, with words and expressions in 
Spanish related to bull-fighting ('salir al ruedo', 'vestirse de luces', 'torear algo', 'dar la 
puntilla', etc.). These expressions nave a strong cultural component, since only those 
familiar with the language of bullfighting can interpret them in an adequate way, and 
bullfighting is an activity that is strongly linked to a large number of Spanish-speakers 
around the world. Similar examples can be found in expressions taken from cricket in 
British English, such as 'you're out', or from martial arts and sumo in Japanese. This 
possibility may pose huge problems for the translator. When the meaning of lexical units 
is linked to cultural lexical scripts, we may have either a coincidence of all the members of 
a certain cultural context within which that script works well with the total population that 
speaks a given language, or a cultural-context coverage of only a part of that population. In 
the latter case, it is possible to find speakers of the language that do not understand certain 
cultural lexical scripts. However, in both cases, translation should try to account for the 
cultural references implied by the lexical unit. Achieving this is difficult, and the meaning 
may be lost when we choose to use an "equivalence" in the target language (e.g., 'bull-
fighter' in English for Spanish 'matador'), unless we make a paraphrase telling more. In 
these cases, when we choose to keep the original lexical unit in the translation (e.g., to use 
'matador' in English), then it is assumed that the meaning has a strong cultural "flavour"; 
but, in any case, a paraphrase may be useful, since we need to make the reader familiar with 
the context from which the unit has been taken. 
However, culture may also show itself in the vocabulary in a completely different way. 
Wierzbicka (1997, 1998) points out how certain concepts linked to culture are best 
expressed by terms of the language normally used in that cultural context. Even terms which 
apparently have an easy cross-cultural translation seem to have meanings which are 
influenced by cultural valúes. In fact, there are many lexical units in different languages that 
have a difficult match, and there are whole lexical áreas which are organized differently. 
These differences can be shown through various word frequencies for the translated terms 
and various degrees of "cultural elaboration"; but, Wierzbicka goes beyond and emphasizes 
the concept of "key words" (cf. Evans-Pritchard, 1968; Williams, 1976; Parkin, 1982, 
Moeran, 1989), that is, "words which are particularly important and revealing in a given 
culture" (Wierzbicka, 1997:15-16). This author mentions, for instance, how the concept 
of 'friendship' -as we know it- has different terms, with different meanings, in different 
languages. The meaning of the lexical unit 'friend' has changed in English in the course of 
time, and she explores this change by examining different expressions that we use nowadays 
('bosom friends', 'to make friends', 'trae friends' vs. 'cióse friends', 'dear friends' vs. 
'enjoyable friends', etc.). However, the differences are even clearer with respect to the 
different conceptions of 'friendship' in Russian (expressed in terms like 'drug', 'podruga', 
'prijaíel', 'tovarisc' or 'rodnye'), in Polish (with terms like 'koledzy', 'kolezanki', 
'przyjaciel', 'znajomi' or 'rodzina'), or even in Australian English with the tenn 'mate' 
(Wierzbicka, 1997: 55-117). When we examine terms from a language of a non-Western 
culture and try to transíate them into English, the lexical distance gets even more 
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conspicuous. This happens with Japanese, for instance. Wierzbicka (1997: 235-278) also 
examines vocabulary from this language and concludes that lexical units, such as 'amae', 
'enryo', 'wa', 'on', 'giri', 'seishin', 'omoiyari', etc. have a difficult, if not impossible, 
translation into English, and this imposes a strong dependence on context when trying to 
choose a suitable translation. In any case, the translation will not reflect the real meaning, 
since culturally-dependent notions require cultural experience andunderstanding, which the 
audience from another language do not have. When there is a strong coincidence between 
the use of the language and cultural valúes, as it is the case with the examples Wierzbicka 
mentions for Japanese, the solution is difficult and, normally, the original lexical unit in the 
source language is preserved in the target language. 
In addition, vocabulary items are also used to express evaluation by rneans of their 
connotative valué, fn fact, Osgood (1976) proved that evaluation itself is a very important 
fector in the connotative valué of many words. Moreover, the author of any text can use 
vocabulary in such a way that it helps transmit a certain ideology and certain valúes. This 
can be accomplíshed by means of assigning certain behaviour and situational structures by 
means of explicit reference to focts, ideas or simply valúes to concrete lexical units (e.g., 
words referring to political tendencies, such as 'communist', 'socialist', or 'conservative' 
can be assigned by different groups of speakers to different behaviour categories), which 
then get 'loaded' with meaning. Marked ideological language involves evaluation, either 
positíve or negative, and an ideological domainto which we can refer. Ideological domains 
may be different in different languages, since they depend heavily on cultural context, 
especially as regards politics, religión, social groups, etc. It may be the case that lexical 
units with a clear and very straightforward translation may lose their original ideological 
connotation as conceras their equivalence in the target language. This happens even with 
plain connotative valúes in terms of the opposition positive-negative. The word 'sofisticado' 
in Spanish has a pejorative valué, with the valué of 'too complex', 'too complicated', 
'adulterated', or 'unnatural' (showing affectation), which its equivalent in English, 
'sophisticated', does not have. In this case, it is difficult to transíate the connotative valué 
if it does not exist in the target language due to cultural reasons. 
To the complex problem of the differences in the encoding of different cultural concepts 
in two sepárate languages, we should add the problem of different levéis of expertise in 
concrete knowledge domains in the same language or in two sepárate languages, or the so-
called distinction between "folk categories" and "expert categories" (cf. Taylor, 1989: 72). 
This distinction has to do with Putnam's notion of the división of labour within a speech 
community (1975). Ordinary speakers identify objects in the world by means of 
"stereotypes", which rely on our knowledge of perceptual and ínteractional attributes of 
certain instances. At the same time, there are bodies of experts in the same speech 
community for whom the same objects or notions are defined in a more scientific, expert 
way. We have the well-known example of the term 'whale' in folk biological taxonomies 
versus 'whale' in a scientific biological taxonomy. A whale may be thought of as a kind of 
'fish' in a popular taxonomy, whereas it is always a mammal in biology. This is an extreme 
case, because everybody nowadays is aware of its 'mammal' status in a scientific taxonomy; 
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but, it may still be considered as a físh in idioms and in some popular uses of the term (for 
fishermen, it may be something similar to a fish; and so, it must be conceptualized as such). 
The issue is more relevant for the use of certain terms in specialized domains, since it may 
be the case that language users are unaware of the specialized meaning unless explicitly told 
about it. The importance of accurate language in science and in law (among other 
disciplines) gives a prominent role to definitions. In science, any discussion needs clear 
definition of the terms used. Otherwise, scientists may end up discussing different things. 
3. The need for a common core. The example of 'Freedom' 
All of these elements -culture, connotation and ideological valúes, as well as domain 
specificity- contribute to the considerable richness of vocabulary meaning, which makes 
things more complicated to translators. However, the fact that there exist differences in 
these aspects across languages does not necessarily imply that there should be 
unsurmountable problems in translation. In spite of all the differences, there will always be 
a "common core", which is amenable to translation, and we can ¡Ilústrate this by 
commenting on some of the culture-specific vocabulary analyses carried out by Arma 
Wierzbicka(1997). 
There are two English words which clearly have a subtle cultural "flavour", so to speak; 
these are freedom and liberty. We all know what freedom means, and we assume that the 
meaning is very similar in the corresponding translations to other languages. However, 
Wierzbicka (1997: chapter 3) has shown, in a very convincing manner, that freedom is a 
concept with different meanings in different languages, according to cultural motivations. 
Wierzbicka defines different possibilities fot freedom and liberty, by using a metalanguage 
with the semantic primitives she has identified after having studied a wide variety of 
languages inthe world (cf. Wierzbicka, 1996). The definitions she gives are the following: 
freedom [freedom2] 
(a) someone (X) can think something like this: 
(b) if I want to do something I can do it 
(c) no one else can say to me: "you can't do it because I don't want this" 
(d) if I don't want to do something I don't have to do it 
(e) no one else can say to me: "you have to do it because I want this" 
(f) this is good for X 
(g) it is bad if someone cannot think this 
freedom (older) [freedom1] 
(a) someone (X) can think something like this: 
(b) if I want to do something I can do it 
(c) I don't have to think: I can't do it 
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überty [liberty2] 
(a) everyone can think something like this: 
(b) if I want to do something because I think it is good I can do it 
(c) no one can say: "this person can't do it because I don't want this" 
(d) everyone thinks: this is good 
liberty (older) [liberty1] 
(a) someone (X) can think something like this: 
(b) if I want to do something I can do it 
(c) I don't haveto think: 
(d) someone can say: "I don't want this" 
(e) I can't do it because of this 
Her argument is that these words have idiosyncratic definitions which they do not share with 
others that are normally used as their translation equivalents in other languages. She 
explicitly mentions libertas (with several meanings) in Latín, the Russian svoboda and volja 
(two meanings), and wolnosc in Polish. However, in contrast with what she claims, there 
seems to be in íact a core meaning offreedom, which is shared with the other terms, 
although with different semantic restrictions. Wierzbicka is not very enthusiastic in her 
writings about assigning a fuzzy structore to meaning, with different levéis of 
prototypicality for the different members of a category (cf. Taylor, 1989). Notwithstanding 
this íact, she builds definitions by showing a core meaning and, around it, different 
marginal members of the concept. 
Let us see this with the running examples offreedom and liberty. According to the above 
definitions, there is something in common, a pivotal definition, which is the following: 
FREEDOM 
(a) someone (X) can think something like this: 
(b) If I want to do something I can do it. 
Of all the different definitions that Wierzbicka (1997:154-155) gives of more or less 
equivalent words for four languages, there is only another possibility, which is found in the 
Latín libertas and the Polish wolnosc, which is: 
LIBERTAS 
(a) someone (X) can think something like this. 
(b) when I do something I do it because I want to do it 
which still contains the same predicates (to do something, and to want to do something), but 
in reverse order. Thus, the difference is only in emphasis on one or the other direction of 
the causal chain. 
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Let us, therefore, take the two-line definition for FREEDOM, and we still have 
different possibilities for extensión, which characterizes the different meanings in the 
differenttenns. Freedom1 (the older freedom) only adds 
(c) I don't have to think: I can't do it 
Freedom2 arises out of freedom1 by means of a double transfonnation in the analytical 
structure of its definition, and (b) has now two possibiüties: not only can I do something if 
I want to, but I can also choose not to do something if I don't want to. Accordingly, there 
is the possibility of nobody being able to say that no one has forced the decisión: 
(b) if I want to do something I can do it 
(c) no one else can say to me: "you can't do it because I don't want this" 
(d) if I don't want to do something I don't have to do it 
(e) no one else can say to me: "you have to do it because I want this" 
An evaluative component is also added: 
(f) this is good for X 
(g) it is bad if someone cannot think this 
It is important to notice that this definition is an extensión from the previous one. The 
concept is more elaborated, but it is not incompatible. 
Something similar can be said of liberty. It starts with the basic two-line definition, and 
adds three more lines, in which complete independence from what others think is stated: 
(c) I don't have to think: 
(d) someone can say: "I don't want this" 
(e) I can't do it because of this 
The historical transfonnation into liberty2 is more complex man v/'tíhfreedom2. (a) and (b) 
accomodate not "someone" but "everyone". Complete independence from others' thoughts 
in (c)-(e) above changes into complete impossibility of others' thoughts against the free 
action: 
(c) no one can say: "this person can't do it because I don't want this" 
And here again, there is now evaluation: 
(d) everyone thinks: this is good 
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Wierzbicka writes these defínitions by drawing on linguistic evidence of a shift in 
meanings, especially regarding the kinds of constractions in which these words can appear. 
However, with a completely analytical procedure, we can see the direction the shift has 
taken. From more dependence to more independence of others' opinions, and towards a 
concept of FREEDOM positively evaluated. We can then posit that there has been a 
progressive restriction of meaning, which at the same time groups all these senses by means 
of a "family resemblance". Paradoxically, Wierzbicka's refusal to talk in terms of more 
prototypical members vs.more marginal members of a given category cannot be 
understood, since these terms can be grouped according to different degrees of 
prototypicality. And what is more interesting is the fact that we can do the same with the 
other terms from other languages that she presente. A more useful way of looking at how 
this group of terms is structured is by considering them as a multilingual radial network, 
which shows some hierarchical relationship among the defínitions of the different words 
involved: 
voljal 
volja2 
FREEDOM 
X I svoboda 
freedoml libertyl 
I 
! 
!Yeedom2 liberty2 
As we can see, we may agree with the fact that "freedom" and "liberty" are two terms 
which cannot be equated with similar terms in other languages. This is very important for 
translation, since it is necessary to provide additional contextual information about what is 
different in the meaning of the word and what is similar. But the important fact here is that 
these words are related and their semantic structure can be connected, no matter how lar 
they are from one another in the radial network. 
4. Conclusión 
This is a very simple example of how vocabulary can be connected beyond language and 
beyond semantic shifts to form a structured whole. Wierzbicka is right when she states that 
different words which are supposed to mean the same are different and that difference is 
strongly conditioned by culture, but a relationship holds; this is, therefore, the reason why 
. wolnosc 
LIBERTAS 
li bertas 1 
libertas2 
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a translator can always fínd a term in the target language even if it is not precise enough. 
Differences in meaning across languages can then be expressed by paraphrase, qualifying 
adjectives or other means. 
We have seen here how content vocabulary may have different connotative valúes and 
different denotational meanings in different languages according to cultural idiosyncracy, 
manifested in both culture-specific "key" meanings and culture-related scripts. To some 
extent there is also the possibility to have differences in térros of expertise related to a 
specific sublanguage. But in all these cases, it is wise to assume that there should be 
sometbing in comrnon across terms in distant languages thatmakes translationpossible, i. e., 
a common core in vocabulary whereby transcultural communication can be achieved. 
Notes 
1. MicroTac Software's Spanish Assistant for Macintosh, versión 1.0. 
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